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I. INTRODUCTION 
The effect of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers on 
product quality was first explored by Akerlof (1970) in his pathbreaking 
paper on the market for "lemons." He showed that if all purchasers have 
imperfect information on quality, then a market for the product may not 
exist, or if it does function it may not be efficient. These results have led 
to a number of papers concerning insurance and labor markets under dif- 
ferent assumptions regarding how agents discriminate between "pro- 
'The research reported in this paper is partially supported by the Bundesrninisterium f i k  
Forgchung und Technologic, F.R.G., contract no. 321/7501/RGB 8001. While support for this 
wark is grateiully acknowledged, the views expressed are the authors' own m d  are not neces 
aarily shared by the sponsor. We are gratetul to  Zenan Fortuna and Serge Medow for compu- 
tational assistance and to  David Cummins and Peyton Young and the participants in the 
Conference on Regulation of the International tnstitute of Management, Berlin, July, 1081, 
especially Jdrg Rnsinger and Paul Kleindorfer. for helpful comments and suggestions. An 
earlier version of this paper is included in the conference proceedings. 
ducts" of varying quality. (See Pauly 1974, Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, 
Wilson 1977, Miyasaki 1977, and Spence 1978). 
These treatments assume that all of the imperfectly informed agents 
have identical levels of knowledge of product quality. In contrast, this 
paper will consider situations where some agents learn over time about 
the quality of a particular good. However, this knowledge is private or 
agent-specific and may be costly for others to obtain. For example, firms 
may learn about the differential skills of their labor force by observing 
their productivity; other firms do not have easy access to this informa- 
tion. Insurance firms learn about the risk characteristics of their custo- 
mers by observing claims records; they will not share these data cost- 
lessly with their competition. We are interested in characterizing the 
nature of the market equilibrium when agents have such private 
knowledge on the endowed qualities of a good. Our analysis is undertaken 
in the context of insurance markets, although it is applicable to those 
situations where sellers cannot easily communicate their product's spe- 
cial qualities to prospective buyers even though the current purchasers 
have a t  least partially observed these features. 
The following problem is first analyzed in detail. Suppose that a set 
of customers has been with a specific insurance firm for t years, durmg 
which time the firm has collected information on their claims experience. 
The insurer naturally will not make these data available to other firms, 
and consumers are unable to furnish verified hstories. Not having direct 
knowledge of each customer's risk class, the insurance firm utilizes 
claims data to set premiums. What is the schedule of profit-maximizing 
rates at  which no customer will have an incentive to purchase insurance 
elsewhere in period t + l? 
We consider two polar cases with regard to the assumption made 
about firm behavior. In one case, we assume that the firm has n o  
j w e s i g h t ,  so that it sets prices to make non-negative expected profits in 
every period. In the other, we assume that the firm has p e r f e c t  fo re s igh t ,  
in the sense that it maximizes the present discounted value of the 
expected profit stream over the planning horizon. We assume in each 
case that consumers choose the firm making the most attractive offer in 
the current period. In this paper, consumers do not have the foresight to 
consider the stream of premiums that will be charged in the current 
period and all future periods. This assumption therefore represents one 
polar case, with perfect consumer foresight models such as those of 
Dionne (1981), Radner (1981), and Rubinstein and Yaari (1980) a t  the 
other extreme. 
We refer to the situation in which neither firm nor customers have 
foresight as s ing le -  per iod  equi l ibr ia ,  since firms can change their price 
from one period to the next and consumers are free to stay or leave as 
they see fit. We refer to the situation in whch firms maximize &scounted 
expected profits but consumers choose only on the basis of current 
period premiums as m y o p i c  m u l t i -  period equ i l i b r ium.  2 
The paper is organized as follows. We first begin at the end, so to 
speak, by considering in Section I1 a static model in whch the firm 
currently selling insurance to individuals has perfect private knowledge 
'one of the purposes of experience rating is to  cope with problems of moral hazard. This pa- 
per does not answer the question as to  whether a premium adjustment process ce.n eliminate 
or substantially reduce moral hazard. The paper also does not consider the possibility of re- 
quiring individuals to state their probability of loss and using experience to "punish" those 
who misstate (cf. Radner 1881, Rubinstein and Yaari 1880). 
about each person's risk class. We show how the premiums charged are 
nevertheless constrained by other insurance firms. Section 111 develops a 
model in which firms use i . o rma t ion  from the claims experience of the 
insured in a Bayesian fashion to adjust individual premiums to experi- 
ence. We show that  in the single-period equilibrium model, the resulting 
premium schedule yields positive expected profits and monopoly distor- 
tions even if  entry by new firms into the  market is completely free. Profit 
or rate regulation would be a natural remedy if reality approximated this 
equilibrium. We further consider briefly the impact on the single period 
equilibrium of permitting customers to buy verified information on their 
experience. This would include purchase of data on premium classifica- 
tions or claim records. 
Section lV shows that in a myopic multi-period equilibrium, expected 
profits are zero with free entry, but price distortions remain. Premiums 
are generally below expected costs in the early periods, but eventually 
rise to  exceed expected costs. The concluding section suggests applica- 
tions and extensions of the analysis. 
IL MARKET EQUILIBRIUM WITH ONE FULLY INFORMED F'IRM 
Our world consists of two types of consumers. Every consumer faces 
the possibility of an identical single loss (x) whch is correctly estimated 
and which is independently distributed across individuals. Each consu- 
mer of type i has a probability of a loss Q i ,  i = H , L  for the high and low 
risk group respectively ( a H > a L ) .  The consumers correctly perceive 
these values of Qi. The proportion of h g h  and low risk consumers in the 
population is given by NH and NL respectively. Type i's preferences are 
represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, Ui,  and each 
consumer determines the optimal amount of insurance to purchase by 
maximizing expected utility E ( U i ) .  The insurance industry consists of n 
firms, all of whom correctly estimate X and the average probability of 
loss correctly. 
We initially assume that each consumer has been insured by the 
same firm for a sufficiently long period of time that the insurer has col- 
lected enough information through claim payments and other data to 
specify ai exactly. The remaining n-1 firms in the industry cannot 
determine whether individuals insured by others are h g h  or low risk peo- 
ple; an insured's past history does not become common knowledge. 
If firms have information on the risk class of their clients they can 
charge differential premiums to high and low risk individuals; other firms 
in the industry are forced to charge the same premium to both groups 
because they cannot distinguish high risks from low risks. However, each 
firm does know how many periods the individual has been in the market. 
including whether he is a new customer. 
Insurers' Potential Strategies 
We now characterize the strategies available to insurers and consider 
the possibility of equilibrium. With regard to a particular client, it is use- 
ful to think of firms as either being "informed," i.e, having sold a policy to 
an individual in the previous period, or "uninformed," i.e., treating the 
client as a customer new to that firm. Each informed insurer offers a 
per-unit premium, Pi ,  to all individuals in risk group i, without specifying 
the amount of coverage, Qi,  which an individual may purchase, except 
that 0 < Qi 5 X .  Insurers who are not informed about a set of individuals 
charge the same price to all of them. Consider first the situation of a 
representative uninformed firm. It knows that each consumer has the 
insurance demand curve: 
which is derived from constrained utility maximization. Since the unin- 
formed firm cannot distinguish among risks, it will have to set 
PH = PL = P .  In a free-entry world with firms that maximize expected 
profit E(rr), the breakeven premium P* for such uninformed firms would 
be given by the lowest value of P  such that: 
where QL is the total amount purchased by each L and QH is the total 
amount purchased by each H at the uniform premium P*.  If equilibrium 
exists, the low risk group will subsidize the high risk group and purchase 
partial coverage QL < X, while Q h  risk individuals will purchase full cov- 
erage, QH = X, at subsi&zed rates. 3 
The informed insurer can use his exact knowledge of each present 
customer's G i ,  i = H , L ,  to set rates tailored to each customer's experi- 
ence. For u h  risk individuals, the informed firm w d  never charge less 
'When the only value of P which satisfies (2) is P* = a H ,  then QL = 0, and the market 
will only provide coverage to high risk individuals. This is a case of market failure, since low 
risk individuals cannot purchase insurance due to imperfect information by firms. 
than i P H .  For low risk individuals, the rate it will charge will depend on 
the premium charged by uninformed firms. The informed firm maxim- 
izes expected profits by charging low risk individuals a price Pi that is a 
little less than the uniform price offered by the uninformed firm to all 
purchasers of insurance. The informed firm then attracts all low risks, 
sells each of them QL units and makes profits of (PL - i P L )  ~i per type L 
person. 
If, for example, uninformed firms are charging P* + 6, the inlormed 
firm will want to charge its low risk customers the lower of one of two 
rates. It will either charge P*, or it will charge pL, the premium which 
would maximize profits on low-risk insureds if the firm were a monopolist. 
At the other extreme, if uninformed firms are charging BH to everyone, 
then the informed firm will charge either aH - E or pL, whichever is less. 
But just as the informed firm's optimal pricing strategy depends on 
the strategies selected by uninformed firms, so does an uninlormed 
firm's strategy depend on what the informed firm is doing. The strategic 
combinations and payoffs are shown as the payoff matrix, in Figure 1, 
with the upper expression in each labeled cell 1...4 being the payoff (pro- 
fib) to the informed firm (I), and the lower expression the payoffs to the 
uninformed firm (U). When one type of firm obtains no business, and all 
customers purchase from the other type of firm, a profit level of zero is 
entered. Here we are assuming that both P* and aH are less than pL. 4 
I %f pL is less than P*, then the informed firm will always charge PH = a H  and = pL 
making positive profits. Uninformed firms will not obtain any business no matter what they 
do. 
- 
Figure 1. Payoff Matrix for Informed and Uninformed Firms. 
Uninformed 
Firm (U) 
Informed 
Stability of Equilibrium 
We will now show that there is no stable Nash equilibrium where there 
are both fully informed and uninformed firms. The argument is simple. If 
U (uninformed) firms chose PU = aH, then I (informed) should choose 
pj$ = aH - e to maximize profits. ~ u t  if I chooses aH - e, there exists 
some smaller P' + 6 at which U can make positive profits, while 1 gets no 
business and makes zero profit. But if U charges some P' + 6, I should 
charge a little less (e.g., P*). Then I makes positive profits, but U suffers 
a loss. To prevent t h s  loss, U must charge at least QH. But then I should 
charge QH - E ,  etc. If there are many players, the absence of a Nash 
equilibrium makes stability unlikely.5 
pi = P' NLQL (p' - @L) > 0 
p V = p ' + 6 < a H  
5 ~ o t e  that, from the viewpoint of a single unintormed firm the maximum value that 6 can 
take in cell 3 in Figure 1 depends on what the firm assumes that the other uninformed firms 
wil l  do. Li they continue playing strategy, then the shgle uninformed firm can charge 
anything less than @H - & and capture all the business with a large profit. Lf each unin- 
formed firm assumes the other uninformed firms will match its prices, then profits will be 
lower. 
pV = aH 
What other concepts of equilibrium might apply here? If both parties 
followed maximin strategies, the outcome would be in cell 2, with the 
strategy ( P L  = P* , Pfi = @ H j  for the informed firm, and [ P V  = B H {  for 
the uninformed firm. In this cell, the uninformed firm is sure that it will 
not lose money (although it will not make profits either). The informed 
firm guarantees itself positive profits. Thus, in a single-play context, or 
with a small number of players, we might expect the outcome to be in cell 
2. 
Another possibility, already used in the literature on insurance 
markets and imperfect labor markets, is the concept of Wilson Equili- 
6 brium. A given set of actions is a Wilson equilibrium if no firm can alter 
its behavior (i.e., propose a different premium) that will (a) earn larger 
positive profits immediately, and (b) continue to be more profitable after 
other firms have dropped all policies rendered unprofitable by the initial 
firm's new behavior. Is the pair ( P L  = P * ,  Ph = ' P H j  and [ P V  = i P H  j a Wil- 
son equilibrium? The alternative strategy for the informed firm is to set 
{PL  = i P H  - E ,  PA = aHj. Tbs earns it larger profits and does not cause 
the uninformed firms to lose money if they maintain their same policy as 
before. However, an informed firm's charging [ PL = GH - E Pfr = 
would permit uninformed firms to make positive protits by switcbng to 
Pu = P *  + 6 ;  this change reduces the informed firm's profit to zero. 
Thus, li we substitute the notion "rendered less profitable" for "rendered 
unprofitable" in part (b) of the above definition, then cell 2 does qualify as 
a Wilson equilibrium. 
'1t was proposed by Wilson (1977) and has been utilized by, among others, Miyadci (1977), 
and Spence (1 W8), to  characterize equilibrium. 
An alternative equilibrium concept which leads to the same conclu- 
sion is based on a Stackelberg leader-follower model. It seems reasonable 
to suppose that the (single) informed firm will play the leadership role. 
We will assume that the informed firm always sets PA = aH. The reaction 
function for the uninformed firm is P V  = j' (PL), and the informed firm 
therefore maximizes its expected profit (TIf): 
If the informed firm sets Pi = P', then PV = j' (P i )  = aH, and the 
informed firm makes positive profits of QL (P' - a L )  on each type-L per- 
son. If the informed firm sets PL = aH - E ,  then PV = j' (PL) = P' + 6, 
and l l f  is zero. Hence, maximization of (3) requires Pi to be P', and the 
Stackelberg equilibrium is given by cell 2. 
To summarize, there are two conclusions based on the above discus- 
sion: 7 
(1) No single-period equilibrium exists, or 
(2) A single-period equilibrium is represented by 
= P', PL = for informed firms. 1Pv = aHJ for unin- 
formed firms, with all business going to informed firms. 
In what follows, we adopt the second conclusion by assuming that the 
mformed and uninformed firms behave in a Stackelberg fashion, with the 
informed firm as the leader and the uninformed firms as the followers. 
This equilibrium is also achieved if one assumes that either firm follows a 
policy that maximizes the minimum profit they could attain no matter 
7 ~ e  have not considered the possibility of mixed strategies. 
what uninformed firms did, or that the modified definition of a Wilson 
equilibrium is appropriate. 
Welfare Effects 
In the no-information case, the equilibrium premium is PC for both 
high and low risks. Compared to the no-information case, perfect private 
knowledge for just one firm leads generally to no gain in welfare for any 
insured person. All of the gains from information go to Wormed 
insurance firms as positive long-run profits. In the special case where low 
risk individuals are charged the monopoly price (i.e., Pi = pL), the low- 
risk class benefits by the amount that the premium is below P*. Even 
then, the higher risk consumers are made unequivocally worse off with 
perfect private knowledge, since the price they pay increases from P* to 
$*. Moreover, the positive profits being earned by informed firms are 
not eroded by entry, since new firms are by definition uninformed ones. 
Nature of EQuilibrium 
We now turn to the more general case where firms learn over time 
about the characteristics of their customers through loss data. Initially 
each firm only knows from statistical records that the proportion of b g h  
and low risk individuals in the insured population is given by NH and NL 
respectively. It does not know whether an individual is in the H or L class 
but does know how many periods each potential customer has been in the 
market (e.g., all 20 year old males are assumed to have been driving 
8 legally since age 16) .  Any new customer would be offered a premium, P * ,  
which is defined as before so that 
E ( T )  = N ~ ( P * - @ ~ )  QL + NH ( p * - a H )  QH = 0 (4) 
That is, the insurer prices so as to yield expected profits of zero on all 
new business. 9 
During each time period, we assume that an individual can suifer at 
most one loss, which will cause X dollars damage. Any time a claims pay- 
ment is made, this information is recorded on the insurer's record and a 
new premium, which reflects his overall loss experience, is set for the 
next period. As before, we are assuming that informed firms do not dis- 
close their records to other firms. Individuals who are dissatisfied with 
their new premium can seek insurance elsewhere. Other firms will not 
have access to the insured's record and hence cannot verify whether an 
applicant has had few or many losses under previous insurance contracts. 
The informed firm uses a Bayesian updating process in readjusting 
its premium structure on the basis of its loss experience. Consider all 
customers who have been with the same insurance company for exactly t 
periods. They can have anywhere from 0 to t losses during this interval. 
The premium charged for period t + 1  to individuals with j losses during 
a t period interval is P;,j = 0 . . . t . lo Firms with loss experience data 
'In this sense, a firm can distinguish between new arrivals to  the market and customers 
ormerly insured by other firms. 
BTh s seems to be the rule that actuaries are instructed to follow in an experience rating 
context. For example, the premium in any one year is supposed to be the previous year's 
premium plus a "bonus" G, where G is defined as: 
and P is the expected value of losses, c i s  the actual amount of loss in the previous period, 1 
is the "safety loading (including normal profit) and k is a fraction less than one. In the ini- 
tial period when G = 0, actuaries will recommend that the premium equal ( 1 + l ) P  (See 
ard, Pentikainen, and Pesonen 1979). eh e are assuming that losses for an individual are independent of previous experience so 
the premium at the end of t is determined only by the number of claims. 
will set each premium P$ so that they maximize expected profits, subject 
H to the constraint that customers remain with them. Let wko and woo be 
the respective probabilities that an individual is in the low and hlgh risk 
class when the firm initially insures him. We can update these probabili- 
ties by using Bayes' procedure. If a customer has suffered exactly j 
losses in a t period interval then we define wjt,  i = L ,H as the probability 
L that he is in the ith risk class, where w# + wjt = 1.'' The premium set 
for each loss classification will also be determined in part by the relative 
values of wjt ,i = L,H. As j increases so does the probability that the 
individual is in the high risk class. Hence, w$ > GI,t, j = 1 . . . , . t .  
Suppose, for example, an informed firm offers a set of ?remiurns 
tpitj, with pJ; increasing as j increases.12 An uninformed firm which 
charged a lower premium than pit in any period would attract all custo- 
mers with j or more 10sses. '~ The proportion of high and low customers 
in its portfolio would be given by 
where sk = probability of a person suffering exactly k losses in a t period 
''we determine wjt as foUows. Let = probability that an individual experiences j 
losses in t periods, if he is in risk class i. Specifically, 
Using Bayes formula 
'%e nll show below that Pjt increaser as j increases. 
13we are assuming no transaction costs for insured individuals to  switch firms. 
interval. In other words, wlt is a weighted average over the loss range 
j . . , t .  Since w$ increases with j we know that w$>w$ for all 
j = 1  . . .  t - 1 and W [  = 4. 
The minimum premium (P];) at which expected profit equals zero for 
uninformed firms is given by: 
H wjt ( p j ; - @ H )  Q; + W$ (pj;  - @ L  ) Q,L~ = o (5) 
where Qjt is demand for group i given a premium We know that P]; 
increases with j since W$ increases with j. Hence any new firm which 
sets P  = P; attracts only customers with j or more losses and makes 
zero expected profits. So (5) correctly describes the minimum level of 
premiums that uninformed firms can charge. 
If the informed firm sets Pjt = P; -E for d y  those customers who 
have suffered exactly j losses, then these individuals will still prefer the 
informed firm. Its expected profits are given by 
For sufficiently small E ,  expected profits in (6) are positive for 
j = 1 . - t - 1 since w$ is less than w;. For j = t ,  as r -. 0, expected 
profits by definition will also approach zero since w; = W& 
To determine the premium structure, an informed firm will also have 
to find the monopoly premiums i p j t  1 for each j = 0 . . t ,  which maxim- 
ize E ( n j t ) .  I t  will maximize expected profits for each loss category if it 
then sets premiums ( p i )  as follows 
pj; = min (P]:; - E . B ~ ~ ] .  j = 0 .  * . t 
The structure of the premiums is thus similar to that in the case of per- 
fect private knowledge outlined above; profits will be lower because firms 
must now use claims information to categorize their customers and 
hence will misclassify some of them. Aggregate expected profits for each 
period t are given by 
An Illustrative Example 
A two-period example using a specific utility function will help to 
fllustrate the meaning of learning from loss experience. The appendix 
describes the basic form of this problem for the exponential utility func- 
tion U ( Y ) = - ~ - ~ .  Consider the specific case where 
@H = ,3,  @ L  = , I ,  X = 40, c = .04, and NL = NH = .5.  Then the equilibrium 
premium in the first period, obtained by solving equation ( 4 ) ,  would be 
P* = .254. Table 1 illustrates how one calculates the weights for deter- 
mining the optimal premium structure at  the end of period 1 when 
j = 0 QT 1, and Figure 2  details the optimal rate structure at  the end of 
period 1 .  
The optimal premiums are pil = ,254 and P ; ~  = .288 since 
pol = p l l  = ,495. The premium charged to the group suffering one loss 
( P ; , ) ,  yields E ( l l l l )  = 0  since P ; ~  = P ; ' ~ ,  and urK = W E .  Expected pro- 
fits for the "zero loss" class is given by (6) and is 
E ( n o 1 )  = .5625 ( .254- . lo)  12 + .4375 ( .254- .30)  40 = .23. 
Aggregate expected profits for period 1 are given by ( 7 )  and in t h s  case 
are E (ml) = .8( .23)  = . l a .  
- 16- 
Table 1: Calculation of Weights wjl and w:, i = L .H for Two Period Model. 
7.69 12 
Figure 2. A Two Period Example Based on Loss Experience. 
What effects do experience rating have on consumer well-being in 
this example? In the absence of any information, both high and low risks 
would have been charged .254 in each of the two periods. When informa- 
tion is obtained through experience, those individuals with no losses are 
charged the same rate as initially, .254, but the others with one loss are 
charged ,288. Thus both high and low risk customers are made either no 
better off or worse off if firms can generate information. In contrast, it 
the firm would have charged breakeven prices, its premium would have 
been .237 to individuals with zero losses. 
As a customer's life with the company increases, then he faces a 
larger number of rate classes reflecting possible outcomes. Firms make 
the largest profit on those insured individuals who experience the fewest 
losses. In the limit as t + m, all customers will be accurately classified 
and we have the case of perfect private knowledge. Figure 3 graphically 
depicts how aggregate expected profit changes over time as a function of 
the proportion of low risk customers in the population. As NL decreases 
then the informed firm's profit potential decreases since a larger propor- 
tion of individuals will suffer losses. 
Obtaining Verified Information 
The problem in achieving optimality arises, of course, because 
informed firms--the ones from whch the consumer is currently 
purchasing--price so as to obtain positive long-run expected profits. A 
natural response of low risk consumers facing such a situation is to seek 
some way of provldlng reliable information on their status to other 
insurance firms. There are two ways in whch such data might be 
Aggregate Expected 
Profit ( E (ITt) ) 
0 6 12 18 24 30 
Time 
Figure 3. Aggregate Expected Profits [E(nt)] as a Function of 
Proportion of Low Risk Customers (NL) and Time ( t ) .  
disseminated: (1) Consumers might provide verified information on their 
actual number of losses (claims), and/or (2) Consumers might provide 
verified information on the size of their premium bill for a given level of 
insurance, since this is a perfect indicator of the risk class into which 
they are being placed by their current insurer. 
We would expect that consumers will find it difficult and costly to 
undertake either of these actions. For one thmg, the current insurer has 
an incentive to conceal its claims and premium data. For another thing, 
purchasers of insurance who have had unfavorable loss experiences may 
t ry  to represent themselves as belng a better risk by using techniques 
such as bogus invoices, or applying for insurance right after an accident 
but before a new bill is issued. Note that the informed firm will not 
discourage these actions, because such behavior makes it more difficult 
for customers with good experience to communicate their status reliably. 
The cost of providing reliable information by insured individuals will 
still permit the original insurer to earn some positive profits and the 
above models would still be relevant in determining what rate structure 
could be set  by informed firms. One could formally incorporate the costs 
of communicating verified information into a more general model of the 
choice processes 01 insurers and insured. Profits would then be limited 
by the alternatives available to consumers for purchasing verified infor- 
mation. 
AT. A MYOPIC MULTI-PERIOD MODEL 
We now investigate the consequences of changing the assumption 
that there is no insurer foresight. We consider a model in which firms 
look beyond current period losses to potential future profits. Firms are 
therefore assumed to be concerned with the present discounted value of 
the profit stream they expect to earn. But purchasers are still assumed 
to  be myopic, in the sense that they choose which insurer to patronize by 
looking only a t  current period prices and selecting the firm with the 
lowest current premium. If the firm is willing to tolerate negative 
expected profits for a while in order to attract customers and observe 
their claims experiences, it can then use this information to make posi- 
tive expected profits in the future to offset (in present value terms) the 
initial losses. 
It is easy to see that the "single-period" premium schedule IPS] may 
then not be an equilibrium. On the one hand, a firm that charged less 
than P: in the initial period would have an expected loss in that period; 
on the other hand, it would have the opportunity to observe which indivi- 
duals did and did not have losses during that period. If it used that infor- 
mation to charge the schedule P; in subsequent periods, the present 
discounted value of the profit stream associated with this pricing policy 
could be sufficient to offset the initial expected losses. Hence, a new 
schedule, with the lower Po,, would dominate the single-period equili- 
brium schedule. 
What new set of premiums would represent a n  equilibrium schedule? 
I t  would be one where, for all t and j ,  there would be no opportunity for a 
previously uninformed firm to enter and earn positive expected profits. 
To simplify the explanation of how this schedule is derived, we assume an 
interest rate of zero, so as not to be concerned with discounting. We 
assume that the firm which has attracted a customer in period 0 will want 
to set  its premiums for all future periods up to the end of the planning 
horizon T so that no firm entering the market in later periods can attract 
any set  of its customers and make a stream of profits whose sum is posi- 
tive. That is, it will want to set P T s o  that 
lor all j .  Here ~ T i s  also the price that the new entrant would charge. 14 
14we will assume that purchasers buy all of their insurance from a single firm. Alternatively, 
r e  could have assumed that each firm receives a constant share of an insured's business in 
every period, and that all firms are aware of this fact. 
The procedure in constructing a set of premiums IP;? requires one 
to start at period T and work backwards. Any dninformed firm who 
enters the market at  the beginning of period T must break even, because 
there is by definition no future period in which losses can be recouped. 
Hence. P; = PiT for all j. Now consider period T - 1. If a firm entered 
in this period it could observe the experience of its customers for one 
period and make profits on on all those individuals who did not have a loss 
during this period. 
The expected profits in period T are derived using the same type of 
Bayesian updating procedure described in Section 111. In order to prevent 
new entrants from coming into the market in period T - 1, the informed 
firm must set its premium in period T - 1 sufficiently low so that a poten- 
tial new entrant would suffer a loss just a little larger than the profit he 
would earn in period T .  As in the single period equilibrium model, there 
will be a different premium for each value of j. This set of policies 
l~c~~~j would then be the equilibrium schedule for the fully informed 
firm. 
The same type of reasoning is utilized to compute the equilibrium set 
of premiums for period T-2.  In this case a potential entrant who attracts 
customers can make profits in periods T-1  and T by utilizing claims 
information on their insured population. The informed firm will then have 
to set l~T~-~j a t  levels which erase all these potential profits of a new 
firm. The same process is repeated sequentially for all periods through 
t = O .  
To illustrate differences between resulting premiums in the single 
period equilibrium and myopic multi-period equilibrium cases we con- 
sider a n  example with T = 5. Table 2 compares the set  of premiums and 
expected profits for the two models. In the single period equilibrium 
model the informed firm's premium (P,L,) s tar ts  off equal to the average 
actuarial value (P ' = ,254) and increases above this level for customers 
who experience losses. In the myopic case, the initial premium, P:, is 
less than P ', and increases over time whether or not the person suffers a 
loss.15 As t approaches T, the premiums for the  two types of equilibria 
converge as expected. In the single-period case, the stream of profits is 
positive, in all periods; in the multi-period myopic case the  firm suffers 
losses in the early periods recouping them in later periods so that  the 
expected s t ream of profits is zero. 
Table 2 reveals that  there is a perversity and allocative inefficiency 
in the  multi-period myopic case. Consumers are  undercharged in the 
early periods but will find that  their premiums are raised even if they are 
accident free. Persons nearing the end of their risk horizons (e.g., the 
aged who will only be driving for a few more years) will tend to be over- 
charged for insurance, whereas the young will tend to be undercharged. 
Hence, consumers will tend to over-purchase insurance in the early 
periods, and under-purchase insurance in the later periods. If regulation 
could be used to bring premiums closer to the actuarial values, there 
would be a welfare gain. 
'Tt is theoretically possible for consumers inhally to be charged a negative premium to at- 
tract them to the insurance company so that they could be charged higher premiums as t 
increases. Tn this case, individuals could be given a free gift for taking out insurance, in an 
analogous fashion to the approach used by savings banks to attract new accounts. 
Table 2. Comparison Between Premiums and Expected Profits for Single Period 
Equilibrium and Myopic Multi-Period Equilibrium Schedule 
for Five Period Problem. 
Single Period Equilibrium 
Myopic Multi Period Equilibrium 
Period I 
Y Number 
4 
.254 
.39 
.283 
.08 
.295 
.01 
.299 
.oo 
.30 
.OO 
.48 
losses j Of \I 
5 
.254 
.39 
.281 
.12 
.294 
.O 1 
.298 
.oo 
.30 
.OO 
.30 
o 
.52 
2 
.254 
.30 
.286 
.02 
.296 
o 
.32 
1 
.254 
.18 
.288 
0 
.18 
3 
.254 
.36 
.285 
.04 
.296 
.OO 
.299 
0 
.40 
0 
.254 
0 
0 
'Period 
Y Number 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
~(n:) 
"o't 
E (no't ) 
Prt 
E(n;J 
p i t  
E(nit)  
p i t  
p4't 
E(nft 
" i t  
E (nzt ) 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND EXTENSIONS 
Our results have some important implications for the notion that 
development of "reputations" for quality can over time alleviate the prob- 
lem of agent ignorance (Akerlof 1970). In both of our models, there is an 
incentive to keep information about quality private, even if the explicit 
cost of communicating it to others is low. In our first model, the agent 
with private knowledge loses monoply rents by communicating this infor- 
mation to others. In the second model he earns no rents in the long run; 
however, he would impose losses on himself if he initially followed the 
loss-leader strategy but then communicated the information he had 
gained from claims experience before he had time to recoup his losses. 
Conversely, even if he "promised in the initial period to communicate 
the truth, he would always gain from concealing or corrupting informa- 
tion which identifies the good (high quality) risks. These disincentives to 
communicate reliable information are greater if the item being tran- 
sacted is bought in lumpy amounts, as in the case of a worker's services; 
the employer who learns which of his employees are of higher produc- 
tivity will be downright reluctant to communicate that knowledge to other 
potential employers. 
m l e  "friends and neighbors" do sometimes communicate informa- 
tion about product quality (good restaurants, good doctors) and whle 
employers do write letters of reference for good employees, our models 
suggest that such behavior is not likely to occur in all circumstances. 
Even where concealing private information ends up benefiting none and 
harming all, it will still be difficult tor the market to break away from 
such an equilibrium. 
The most obvious extensions of these models is to permit consumers 
to be less myopic. If consumers do have foresight, then they may want 
the insurer to agree in the initial (purchase) time period to provide accu- 
rate information on future loss experience. The mere availability of such 
information would, in itself, be sufficient to eliminate either monopoly 
profits or the zero-profit distortions in the multi-period myopic model. 
Guaranteeing that such information is provided is not easy, of 
course, since the low risks must not only ensure that accurate informa- 
tion on his own experience is provided but also that accurate (unfavor- 
able) information is provided on the experience of those h g h  risks who 
are thinking of switching to another firm. That is, he must monitor the 
accuracy of all information provided. For example, in a labor market 
application of our theory, a high productivity worker must not only verify 
that his employer will provide him with a good and true recommendation; 
he must also verify that poorer quality workers are being furnished bad 
recommendations or references. 
If the worker has foresight, it is easy to see that he will be con- 
cerned, in the initial period, with the schedule by which his future premi- 
ums will be adjusted as a result of his future experience. Different risk 
types mgh t  be expected to select different schedules and Dionne's work 
(1981) shows that it is possible in a monopoly context to find schedules 
which separate these groups e z  ante when each risk type chooses the 
schedule which maximizes its utility. But as Dionne remarks, it is not 
obvious that these schedules will be sustainable if persons with unfavor- 
able experience can switch from firm to firm without being compelled to 
provide a valid history of their experience. That is, if a high risk's hs tory  
does not necessarily "follow" him from firm to firm, optimal equilibrium 
may not be sustainable. 
There needs to be further development of the theory for such 
consumerforesight models. At the same time, there needs to be further 
empirical verification of the degree of foresight inhviduals actually 
display. Do purchasers of automobile insurance know and fully take 
account of the way their premiums will vary with their claims history? Do 
workers know and take into account the way their future wages will vary 
with observed productivity? If consumers display only limited foresight, 
the models of market equilibrium developed in this paper will be 
appropriate. 
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Risk averse consumers of each type i with wealth, 4, want to choose a 
value of Qi given iP i  and Pi which maximizes: 
E [u i (~ i ) I  = Qi U i [ A ,  - X  + ( 1 - P i )  Qi]  + Ui (A, - Pi Qi)  (A .1 )  
subject to 
Let Ri be the contingency price ratio 
Pi ( 1  4,) 
R' = ( l - P i ) B i  
and define Rim= and R~~~~ as the values of Ri where Qi = 0 and Qi = X 
respectively when one maximizes E [ Ui ( Q i ) ]  without any constraint on 4. 
*A more detailed discussion of this model appears in Kunreuther (1076). 
Then if 
t d u i  
ui = - d 2 U i  > 0 and U: = - < 0 d Qi d Q: 
the optimal solution to (A. 1) is given by: 
Whenever Pi c 9 i ,  then Qi = X, since in this range the premium is 
either actuarially fair or subsidized. Suppose both consumer types have 
identical utility functions given by the exponential 
UH(Y) = UL ( Y )  = -B''', where c is the risk aversion coefficient. Then Qi 
is determined by 
